The Digital Smoking Gun: Unpacking the Forensics of AI 'Hallucinations' in Discovery

Table of Contents
- Introduction: From Black Box to Deterministic Failure
- The "Inspect Element" Threat Vector
- The Forensic Trinity: Fingerprints, Seeds, and Logprobs
- The conversations.json Tree Structure
- The Timeline of Accountability
- Conclusion: The New ESI Standard
- Research Sources
Introduction: From Black Box to Deterministic Failure
In the immediate aftermath of Mata v. Avianca, the legal profession treated AI hallucinations as a novelty—a terrifying, "black box" glitch that caught a hapless lawyer off guard. Two years later, the narrative has shifted. Hallucinations are no longer viewed as inexplicable acts of God; they are viewed as deterministic failures of process.
For legal technologists and forensic experts, this shift presents a new challenge. When a lawyer claims, "The AI made it up," or conversely, "I verified this, and the AI is wrong," how do we validate that claim? The answer lies in the specific, byte-level artifacts left behind by Large Language Models (LLMs).
This post breaks down the forensic architecture of a hallucination, identifying the specific JSON parameters, log files, and API signals that differentiate a stochastic error from intentional fraud.
The "Inspect Element" Threat Vector
Before diving into server-side logs, we must address the client-side reality. In 2025, a screenshot of a ChatGPT session is forensic hearsay.
Any text in a browser-based chat interface is rendered in the Document Object Model (DOM). Using the browser's "Inspect Element" tool, a bad actor can locally modify the HTML to:
- Insert a hallucination
- Alter a timestamp
- Inject a prejudicial prompt
Then screenshot the result. The server logs would show one conversation; the screenshot shows another.
The Fix
Never accept static images. Authenticity requires one of the following:
| Verification Method | Description |
|---|---|
| Share Link | Pulls directly from OpenAI/Anthropic servers |
| Data Export (JSON) | Native format, validated against platform schema |
The Forensic Trinity: Fingerprints, Seeds, and Logprobs
When analyzing LLM interactions via API or enterprise logs, three specific parameters serve as the "digital DNA" of a session. If you are drafting ESI (Electronically Stored Information) protocols, these are your target fields.
system_fingerprint: The Configuration Hash
Introduced by OpenAI to combat non-determinism, the system_fingerprint field in the API response represents the specific backend configuration (weights, infrastructure state, software version) at the moment of generation.
Forensic Value: If opposing counsel claims they cannot reproduce a hallucination because "the model changed," the fingerprint is the tie-breaker. If two requests share a fingerprint and a seed but yield different results, it proves the variance lies in the temperature setting, not a system update.
{
"id": "chatcmpl-abc123",
"object": "chat.completion",
"system_fingerprint": "fp_44709d6fcb",
"choices": [...]
}
logprobs: The Confidence Trace
The logprobs (logarithmic probabilities) parameter exposes the model's confidence for each generated token.
Forensic Value: A true hallucination often carries a distinct statistical signature:
- Low log probability on proper nouns (case names)
- High probability on structural tokens ("v.", "F. Supp. 2d")
If the logs show high confidence on a fake case name, it suggests the model was "poisoned" by context (e.g., a leading prompt from the user) rather than a random stochastic failure.
{
"logprobs": {
"content": [
{
"token": "Martinez",
"logprob": -8.234,
"top_logprobs": [...]
},
{
"token": " v.",
"logprob": -0.012,
"top_logprobs": [...]
}
]
}
}
In this example, the low logprob (-8.234) on "Martinez" indicates the model was not confident in this token—a hallmark of fabricated content. The high confidence (-0.012) on "v." shows the model knows it's generating a case citation structure.
seed: The Determinism Key
This integer forces the model to sample deterministically.
Forensic Value: In forensic reconstruction, re-running a prompt with the same seed and temperature=0 should reproduce the hallucination. If it doesn't, the user's claimed prompt history may be incomplete or edited.
{
"model": "gpt-4",
"seed": 12345,
"temperature": 0,
"messages": [...]
}
The Forensic Decision Tree
| Condition | Implication |
|---|---|
| Same fingerprint + same seed + different output | User changed temperature or prompt |
| Same fingerprint + same seed + same output | Reproducible hallucination (model error) |
| Different fingerprint + same seed + different output | Model was updated between requests |
| No seed provided | Cannot deterministically reproduce |
The conversations.json Tree Structure
For web-interface users (standard ChatGPT), the conversations.json file in the data export is the primary evidence container. Unlike a linear transcript, this file stores data as a tree structure.
conversation_root
├── message_001 (user prompt)
│ └── message_002 (assistant response)
│ └── message_003 (user follow-up)
│ ├── message_004 (response - SHOWN IN UI)
│ └── message_004_alt (edited response - HIDDEN)
└── message_001_branch (edited prompt - ORPHANED)
└── message_002_branch (different response - ORPHANED)
The JSON object contains a mapping field. This is critical because it preserves the edit history.
The Branching Factor
When a user edits a prompt and regenerates an answer, they create a new branch in the tree. The UI only shows the final "leaf" node.
The Forensic Artifact
The JSON export often retains the "orphaned" branches. A forensic analysis can reveal if a user:
- Tried a prompt like "Write me a fake case"
- Got a refusal
- Edited it to "Hypothetically, if there were a case..."
- Presented the result as fact
The intent to deceive resides in the deleted branch.
{
"mapping": {
"node_001": {
"id": "node_001",
"message": {
"content": {
"parts": ["Find me cases about X"]
}
},
"parent": "root",
"children": ["node_002", "node_003_edited"]
},
"node_003_edited": {
"id": "node_003_edited",
"message": {
"content": {
"parts": ["Pretend there's a case called..."]
}
},
"parent": "node_001",
"children": ["node_004_fabricated"]
}
}
}
The Timeline of Accountability
Courts are moving faster than technology. The judiciary has rapidly escalated from "warnings" to "disbarment-level sanctions" for AI-related evidentiary failures.
| Year | Case/Event | Outcome |
|---|---|---|
| 2023 | Mata v. Avianca | $5,000 sanctions; "bad faith" finding |
| 2023 | Park v. Kim (TX) | Sanctions for fabricated citations |
| 2024 | United States v. Cohen | Highlighted verification failures |
| 2024 | Multiple state bar opinions | Mandatory disclosure of AI use |
| 2025 | Sedona Conference Guidelines | ESI protocols for GenAI data |
The Emerging Standard
Courts are establishing that:
- AI use must be disclosed when material to proceedings
- Verification is non-delegable - "the AI did it" is not a defense
- Metadata preservation is expected for AI-generated content
- Forensic reconstruction may be required to establish authenticity
Conclusion: The New ESI Standard
The "black box" defense is dead. AI interactions generate a rich trail of metadata that can prove—or disprove—negligence.
For technical teams supporting litigation, the mandate is clear: update your preservation letters. A request for "all documents" is insufficient. You must specifically request:
| Evidence Type | Format | Contains |
|---|---|---|
| Native JSON exports | .json |
Full conversation tree with branches |
| API access logs | Server logs | Fingerprints, seeds, timestamps |
| Session metadata | Platform-specific | Temperature, model version, tokens |
| Browser artifacts | HAR files | Network requests, timing data |
In the era of generative text, the truth isn't just in what the document says; it's in the probabilities that built it.
Key Takeaways
- Screenshots are hearsay - Require native exports or authenticated share links
- The forensic trinity -
system_fingerprint,logprobs, andseedare your evidentiary anchors - Branching reveals intent - Edited prompts expose the journey to fabrication
- Preservation must be specific - Generic document requests miss AI artifacts
Research Sources
- Mata v. Avianca, Inc., 678 F. Supp. 3d 443 (S.D.N.Y. 2023)
- United States v. Cohen, 724 F. Supp. 3d 251 (S.D.N.Y. 2024)
- OpenAI API Documentation: System Fingerprints & Logprobs
- The Sedona Conference, Brainstorming Group on the Discovery and Admissibility of GenAI Data (2025)



